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Introduction: “Humanity Appears upon the Scene”
1 With a self-acknowledged nod to classical drama, Hardy famously opened The Return of the
Native with a chapter carefully setting the scene of his action: he describes at length the
details of the animal and vegetal life as well as the historical layers that make up the land
of Egdon Heath, before allowing the human actors to step inside the duly exposed décor.
The second chapter’s title then comes to signal the disruptive presence of man, acting as
an unequivocally prophetic maxim: “Humanity Appears upon the Scene, Hand in Hand
with Trouble” (Hardy 1999, 13).
2 It is not so much the ensuing “trouble” of the dramatic plot that interests me here (a lot
has already been said about it) as the idea that in The Return of the Native as in Hardy’s
works more generally, that setting, that “scene” is already in itself a character in the plot.
Saying so is almost a topos of Hardy criticism, as there has long been a fascination among
readers for that background, that geography, that Wessex which seems to constitute the
backbone of Hardy’s work. D. H. Lawrence even went so far as writing: “This is a constant
revelation in Hardy’s novels: that there exists a great background, vital and vivid, which
matters more than the people who move upon it” (Lawrence 70). Yet in no way does this
mean that “the people” are forgotten – not as individuals; it is a background that does not
crush its actors but rather reveals the vibrating intensity of their lives as individuals,
something Gilles Deleuze expressed beautifully:
Take as an example the case of Thomas Hardy: his characters are not people or
subjects,  they  are  collections  of  intensive  sensations,  each  is  such  collection,  a
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packet, a bloc of variable sensations. There is a strange respect for the individual,
an extraordinary respect: not because he would seize upon himself as a person and
be recognized as a person, in the French way, but on the contrary because he saw
himself  and saw others  as  so  many ‘unique chances’  –  the unique chance from
which  one  combination  or  another  had  been  drawn.  Individuation  without  a
subject.  And  these  packets  of  sensations  in  the  raw,  these  collections  or
combinations, run along the lines of chance, or mischance, where their encounters
take place – if need be, their bad encounters which lead to death, to murder. Hardy
invokes a sort of Greek destiny for this empiricist experimental world. Individuals,
packets  of  sensations,  run  over  the  heath  like  a  line  of  flight  or  a  line  of
deterritorialization of the earth. (Deleuze & Parnet 39-40)
3 Wessex – that vibrating microcosm endowed with a universal scope – is indeed in itself a
“bloc of variable sensations”, and Hardy’s perception of humanity is one that posits the
individual as that land, as a geography – a collection of lines, of encounters and of
intensities. Isabelle Gadoin pointed in particular at the way Wessex does not so much
function for the characters as an object of knowledge that remains external to them, but
as “a sediment deposited at the heart of people’s minds and consciousness, according to
some ingrained principle of solidarity that brings space and time together. The world we
perceive,” she explains, “is much more than the world that reaches our senses: it is the
interweaving of all the experiences we live.” (Gadoin 77)1 
4 My  objective  here  will  be  to  illustrate  that  vision,  first  focusing  on  the  “strange,
extraordinary respect  for  the individual”,  then on the idea of  intensive and variable
sensations, of vibrating collections of lines, with references to several aspects of Hardy’s
writing.
 
Altruism and the human scale: the extremities of war
5 Centrally in Hardy’s work, the sense of an extra-ordinary respect for the individual stems
from the fact that the author’s sincere attachment to the living and the human often
expresses itself  in unexpected ways.  Charles Du Bos (1882-1939),  a French writer and
literary critic from the first half of the 20th century who wrote some of the most beautiful
pages to have been devoted in French to Hardy2, seems to have detected that. He uses the
title of a seemingly pessimistic poem by Hardy, “For Life I  Had Never Cared Greatly” 
(Hardy  2001,  537),  yet  reads  it  in  a  very  convincing  way  that  indeed  reveals  the
“strangeness” of Hardy’s respect for the individual:
Yet that sense of life in general with which Hardy both refreshes and stifles us, is
always, ultimately, a vivifying, healthy, salty breath of air; and what’s miraculous in
the case of Hardy is that he should manage to act upon us in such a way without
having ever really cared for life.
                           For Life I had never cared greatly
[…] True; but sometimes with the great – when they are the greatest – not caring
for  life  has  no  other  consequence  but  to  make one care  even more  for  human
beings, caring for them precisely because they are, like oneself, subjected to the
fate of being alive. (Du Bos 854-855)3
6 As stated here, Du Bos sees genius in Hardy because he is overwhelmingly penetrated by a
“sense of life in general”. It seems to me that such perceptiveness is acquired in Hardy’s
works  –  novels,  poems  and  all  other  writings  as  for  example  The  Dynasts,  of  prime
importance here – by an extensive exploration of all forms of existence, whether human,
animal or vegetal, but also of existence on all levels, all scales: from the minute existence
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of insects4 to the immensity of the cosmos, up to the sublime supra-aerial dimensions of
the “Overworld” (The Dynasts).
7 Despite this, Hardy never fails to dwell on the human scale and repeatedly returns to it,
expressing that respect for the individual in different ways, whether in the multiplicity of
voices  and  personal  stories  one  can  hear  in  his  poems  –  and  I  will  return  to  the
multiplicity  of  voices  –  or  in  the  narrative  format  and  techniques  of  his  novels,  as
explained by Gillian Beer: “Though the individual may be of small consequence in the
long sequence of succession and generation, yet Hardy in his emplotment opposes this
perception and does so by adopting again the single life span as his scale. Whereas George
Eliot’s novels, and Dickens’s novels, tend to include death, rather than end with death,
Hardy’s texts pay homage to human scale by ceasing as the hero or heroine dies.” (Beer
223) The ultimate silence of Hardy’s novel-writing thus constitutes a form of respect for
the individual and of humanism – indeed a strange and extraordinary respect, since what
thus signals the author’s reverence for his characters is his insistence on having them die
at the end of his books!
8 In Hardy’s work, the humanistic or altruistic instinct is naturally also expressed in the
recurring motif of “lovingkindness”, a “tender respect for the individuality of others”
(Robinson 143), the origin of which is naturally to be found in Christian charitable love. In
that respect, as noted by several critics, Hardy shares with George Eliot a belief in that
“religion of humanity” defended by Comte (though of course in different ways). Once
again, Charles Du Bos offers some very perceptive phrasing for such a position, calling
both writers “geniuses of sympathy”: “In many respects, George Eliot and Thomas Hardy
are very distant one from the other; yet they meet on that particular point, as can only be
for all the geniuses I would readily call “geniuses of sympathy”, those whose religion –
sometimes their one and only – is that which used to be called “the religion of human
suffering”, unjustly censured as such.” (Du Bos 845)5 There is thus – unsurprisingly – a
strong moral implication to Hardy’s boundless altruism. When he declares in 1904, “What
are my books but a long plea against ‘man’s inhumanity to man’ – to woman – and to the
lower  animals?”  (Pinion  178),  he  is  indeed  calling  for  universal  compassion  and
denouncing, in a very simple way, the absurd cruelty of man. The sincerity of Hardy’s
instinctive sympathy towards animals in particular is further revealed when it surfaces in
his personal writings, as for instance in the following notebook entry from 1888: “13 July.
After being in the street: – What was it on the faces of those horses? – Resignation. Their
eyes looked at me, haunted me. I heard their tramp as I lay in bed, the ghosts of their eyes
came in to me, saying, ‘Where is your justice, O man and ruler?’” (Hardy 1989, 220). Such
reflections are echoed particularly in Hardy’s war poems such as “Horses Abroad” (Human
Shows, 1925; Hardy 2001, 785-786) or “And There Was a Great Calm” (Late Lyrics and Earlier,
1922) which imagines, “On the Signing of the Armistice, 11 Nov. 1918”, “Worn horses mus
[ing]: ‘We are not whipped to-day’” (Hardy 2001, 588-590).
9 The  denunciations  of  man’s  cruelty  and  the  underlying  assertion  of  the  value  of
lovingkindness can thus be found quite explicitly in Hardy’s attitude to war, particularly
in his  redefinition of  patriotism,  simply put  for  example in  a  short  note  from 1922:
“Patriotism, if aggressive and at the expense of other countries, is a vice; if in sympathy
with them, a virtue” (Hardy 1989, 450). Hardy had explicitly stated that redefinition in
earlier letters, written during World War 1, and had also exemplified it in his war poems
from both the Boer War and WW1. On 8 February 1917, in response to the Royal Society of
Literature inviting him to a meeting of a pacifist committee, he thus wrote:
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I regret that as I live in a remote part of the country I cannot attend the meeting of
the Entente Committee.
In respect of the Memorandum proposing certain basic principles of International
education for promoting ethical ideals that shall conduce to a League of Peace, I am
in heart agreement with the proposition. 
I would say in considering a modus operandi:
That nothing effectual will be accomplished in the cause of Peace till the sentiment
of Patriotism be freed from the narrow meaning attaching to it  in the past (still
upheld by Junkers and Jingoists) and be extended to the whole globe.
On the other hand that the sentiment of Foreignness – if the sense of a contrast be
really rhetorically necessary – attach only to other planets and their inhabitants, if
any.
I may add that I have been writing in advocacy of those views for the last twenty
years. (Hardy 1989, 405; Hardy’s emphases)
10 What Hardy seems to be defending here is a form of internationalism (“extended to the
whole globe”), yet one of a purely theoretical nature since it clearly bears no economic
consideration.  In  order  to  promote  his  own  vision  of  equity  Hardy  denounces  the
aggressive  chauvinism of  both  nations  alike  (“Junkers  and Jingoists”6),  hence  paying
particular  attention to  the  rhetorical  implications  of  the  patriotic  terminology  (“the
sentiment of Patriotism”, “the sentiment of Foreignness – if the sense of a contrast be really
rhetorically necessary”). 
11 If one is to take the poem “His Country” (Moments of Vision, 1917; Hardy 2001, 539-540) as a
faithful expression of Hardy’s belief, then his patriotism is one that erases all language
barriers as well as geopolitical frontiers:
I journeyed from my native spot                        He travels
         Across the south sea shine,                        southward,
And found that people in hall and cot                 and looks
Laboured and suffered each his lot                       around;
         Even as I did mine.
Thus noting them in meads and marts                and cannot
         It did not seem to me                                 discover the
That my dear country with its hearts,                   boundary
Minds, yearnings, worse and better parts
         Had ended with the sea.
I further and further went anon,                          of his native
         As such I still surveyed,                               country;
And further yet – yea, on and on,
And all the men I looked upon
         Had heart-strings fellow-made.
I traced the whole terrestrial round,                     or where
         Homing the other side;                              his duties to
Then said I, ‘What is there to bound                   his fellow-
My denizenship? It seems I have found            creatures end
         Its scope to be world-wide.’
I asked me: ‘Whom have I to fight,                    nor who are
         And whom have I to dare,                         his enemies.
And whom to weaken, crush, and blight?
My country seems to have kept in sight
         On my way everywhere.’
12 The poem is also interesting insofar as its speaker seems to assert a belonging to the
world of living beings in its widest and most varied existence, as the term “denizenship”
might denote – a substitute for “citizenship” which seems to signal the extension of the
fraternal community to animal and vegetal life.
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13 There does seem to be a form of humanistic ideal in some of Hardy’s texts, for instance as
we see him hunting altruism down to the very battlefields of WW1, more strikingly so in
“Often When Warring” (Moments of Vision, 1917; Hardy 2001, 545):
Often when warring for he wist not what,
An enemy-soldier, passing by one weak,
Has tendered water, wiped the burning cheek,
And cooled the lips so black and clammed and hot;
Then gone his way, and maybe quite forgot
The deed of grace amid the roar and reek;
Yet larger vision than loud arms bespeak
He there has reached, although he has known it not.
For natural mindsight, triumphing in the act
Over the throes of artificial rage,
Has thuswise muffled victory’s peal of pride,
Rended to ribands policy’s specious page
That deals but with evasion, code, and pact,
And war’s apology wholly stultified.
14 One  could  also  mention  other  war  poems  that  likewise  testify  to  a  redefinition  of
patriotism and a denunciation of the absurdity of fighting from a human perspective.
“The  Man He  Killed”  (Time’s  Laughingstocks,  1909,  dated  1902;  Hardy  2001,  287)  thus
focuses on the fundamental identity of fighters from both sides, making the very notion
of martial antagonism nonsensical:
    ‘Had he and I but met
    By some old ancient inn,
We should have sat us down to wet
    Right many a nipperkin!
     ‘But ranged as infantry,
    And staring face to face,
I shot at him as he at me,
    And killed him in his place.
     ‘I shot him dead because –
    Because he was my foe,
Just so: my foe of course he was;
    That’s clear enough; although
     ‘He thought he’d ’list, perhaps,
    Off-hand like – just as I –
Was out of work – had sold his traps –
    No other reason why.
     ‘Yes; quaint and curious war is!
    You shoot a fellow down
You’d treat if met where any bar is,
    Or help to half-a-crown.’
15 In Hardy’s vision, then, human moral responsibility is quite clearly pointed at, but as the
tautological  phrase  “man’s  inhumanity  to  man”  indicates,  man  is  both  accused  and
celebrated. This isn’t such a surprising or extraordinary perspective, it even stands as
quite typical of a Judaeo-Christian context. 
 
Beauty and grandeur of the commonplace
16 What is maybe less ordinary is how Hardy dwells on the minute, even banal details of
human existence more consistently than on the grand achievements of  mankind.  His
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work celebrates the intensity and value of ordinary life, which he takes pains to record
and describe. “He was a man who used to notice such things”, the poet hopes people will
say of him when he is gone (“Afterwards”, Moments of Vision, 1917; Hardy 2001, 553). And
indeed, one notebook entry from April 1925 says it all: “People came to tea. ” (Hardy 1979,
87)  The  note  (quoted  here  in  full)  is  indeed  extraordinary  in  its  matter-of-factness;
Hardy’s need to keep a record of such a commonplace event albeit with such vagueness
(“People”) is, to me, a remarkable thing. I consequently feel tempted to draw a parallel
with an observation of a similar sort by Schopenhauer who wrote that “a scene from
everyday life can be of great inward significance, if human individuals and the innermost
recesses  of  human  action  and  will  appear  in  it  in  a  clear  and  distinct  light.”
(Schopenhauer 231) 
17 All in all, it seems to me that Hardy’s work is about discovering the peaceful grandeur of
everyday  life  in  the  face  of  a  general  disenchantment  with existence,  a  form  of
ontological disappointment both carried by the author’s personal sensitivity and by the
late Victorian zeitgeist. This is the peculiar strength Paul Zietlow sees in Hardy’s poetry: “
Again and again Hardy’s poetry testifies to the importance of daily life. Again and again
he shows his keen, sympathetic understanding of the kindly variousness of experience,
and of life’s potential to achieve quiet fulfilment day by day in brief, diverse perceptions
of goodness and beauty and in homely acts of ongoing sympathy. Consummations come,
but they are few and far between, and are usually followed by let-down and depression,
disillusionment  and  suffering.  In  the  meantime,  there  is  the  daily  life  of  ordinary
experience, offering little, but nevertheless something.” (Zietlow 238) Here is how that
“extraordinary  respect  of  the  individual”  is  enacted,  “strange”  precisely  because  it
attaches itself to the ordinary minutiae of human existence. Having “an eye for such
mysteries” (“Afterwards”, Moments of Vision, 1917; Hardy 2001, 553) enables the author to
discover how the ordinary is in no way a merely linear continuum of existence. Very
often in Hardy’s texts, and mostly in his poetry, the ordinary is – to return to a Deleuzian
terminology  –  an  encounter,  the  intersection  of  various  trajectories,  of  lines  or
intensities. 
18 As Deleuze noted and as I mentioned earlier, the characters of Hardy’s novels, perceived
as “packets of sensations in the raw”, “run along the lines of chance, or mischance, where
their encounters take place – if need be, their bad encounters which lead to death, to
murder.” (Deleuze & Parnet 39-40) Examples of such tragic encounters are easy to find in
Hardy’s work, but what interests me here are encounters that are apparently of a minor
mode:  in  these,  Hardy’s  respect  for  the  individual  is  at  its  strangest,  its  most
extraordinary, because rather than appealing to compassion for cruel destinies, it calls
upon the subdued intensity of the ordinary experience.
19 The perfect illustration to this is,  rather famously, the poem “An August Midnight” (
Poems of the Past and the Present, 1901; Hardy 2001, 146-147). The scene presents itself as a
suspended moment (carefully situated in time and space as indicated by the mention “
Max Gate, 1899”), its power residing in the underlying vibrating intensity of this apparent
banal experience. It is indeed hard to resist the temptation to connect that intensity with
the vibrating wings of the insects present in the scene, a buzzing that gives its full texture
to the episode, together with the shaded light. A dim light, a commonplace moment – yet
there’s an overwhelming sense of reverence to the scene that no reader would deny, the
intuition that something of great import is being played out before our ears and eyes.
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20 Something similar can be said of what Hardy named “the beauty of association”, which
also testifies to an extraordinary respect for the individual. This idea brings us back to
the connection between subject  and place, individuality  and geography –  as  initially
presented. As early as 1877, Hardy thus wrote (as recorded by The Life): “September 28. . . .
An object or mark raised or made by man on a scene is worth ten times any such formed
by unconscious Nature. Hence clouds, mists, and mountains are unimportant beside the
wear on a threshold, or the print of a hand” (Hardy 1989, 120). The idea was even more
explicitly expressed the following year in Hardy’s consideration of the pictorial methods
of Boldini and Hobbema, which he apparently aimed at applying to his writing: 
April 22 [1878]. – The method of Boldini, the painter of ‘The Morning Walk’ in the
French Gallery two or three years ago (a young lady beside an ugly blank wall on an
ugly highway) – of Hobbema, in his view of a road with formal lopped trees and flat
tame scenery – is that of infusing emotion into the baldest external objects either by the
presence of a human figure among them, or by mark of some human connection with them. 
This accords with my feeling about, say, Heidelberg and Baden versus Scheveningen
– as  I  wrote at  the beginning of  ‘The Return of  the Native’  –  that  the  beauty  of
association is entirely superior to the beauty of aspect, and a beloved relative’s old battered
tankard  to  the  finest  Greek  vase.  Paradoxically  put,  it  is  to  see  the  beauty  in  ugliness.
(Hardy 1989, 123-24; my emphases)7 
21 It thus seems that it is by looking at the raw “ugly” material of reality through the lens of
the human that one may discover its beauty. Here, the intensity of a place depends on the
human presence, whether immediate and tangible or mediated by an object of the most
common sort – another form of extraordinary respect that expresses itself through the
strength of the ordinary.
22 The individual human experience is clearly at the centre of that intensity, whether as
ghosted or imprinted presence, or as the nexus of a suspended moment. It is the multiple
articulations or combinations of such unique traces, unique moments – “unique chances”
or combinations – that make up the “great web of human doings”, to use a key quotation
from The  Woodlanders describing the solitary figures  of  Giles  Winterborne and Marty
South:
Hardly anything could be more isolated or more self-contained than the lives of
these two walking here in the lonely hour before day, when grey shades, material
and mental, are so very grey. And yet, looked in a certain way, their lonely courses
formed no detached design at all, but were part of the pattern in the great web of human
doings then weaving in both hemispheres, from the White Sea to Cape Horn. (Hardy
1998, 21-22; my emphases) 
23 Here is clearly one expression of Hardy’s “keen, sympathetic understanding of the kindly
variousness of experience” (Zietlow 238). This variousness is also a form of variability, as
one is tempted to perceive the great web as a vibrating woven cloth quivering under the
intensity of each unique combination – indeed “a bloc of variable sensations”, to use
again Deleuze’s words.
 
Ipseity and dispossession: the variousness of identity
24 One final aspect of Deleuze’s perspective on Hardy I’d like to explore here is how the idea
of  “individuation  without  a  subject”  reveals  itself  in  Hardy’s  writing  as  a  form  of
dispossession of the self, a divestiture or dessaisissement. That divestiture is a condition to
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true  altruism  and  is  itself  made  possible  precisely  by  the  acknowledgement  of  the
variousness of experience evoked by Zietlow.
25 Firstly, from a post-evolutionary perspective, Hardy’s work quite obviously dramatizes
man’s loss of a central place in the universe.  The end of anthropocentrism is indeed
explicitly depicted in Hardy’s attention to the animal and vegetal world, as well as in his
exploration of the cosmos – delineating what I have named elsewhere, with particular
reference to Two on a Tower, a “cosmic sense of belonging”8. This naturally forces man to
relinquish  his  self-centredness  and  embrace  other  perspectives,  thus  performing  an
initial divestiture of his subject.
26 Interestingly enough,  one finds in Schopenhauer’s  texts (from which Hardy certainly
drew some inspiration9) the idea that only by seeing through the illusion which is the
principle of individuation can man attain true altruism, an altruism that allows him to
experience directly the suffering of all other beings:
If that veil of Maya, the principium individuationis, is lifted from the eyes of a man to
such an extent that he no longer makes the egoistical distinction between himself
and the person of  others,  but  takes as  much interest  in the sufferings of  other
individuals as in his own, and is thus not only benevolent and charitable in the
highest degree, but even ready to sacrifice his own individuality whenever several
others  can  be  saved  thereby,  then  it  follows  automatically  that  such  a  man,
recognizing in all  beings his own true and innermost self,  must also regard the
endless sufferings of all that lives as his own, and thus take upon himself the pain of
the  whole  world.  No  suffering  is  any  longer  strange  or  foreign  to  him.  All  the
miseries of others, which he sees and is so seldom able to alleviate, all the miseries
of  which  he  has  indirect  knowledge,  and  even  those  he  recognizes  merely  as
possible, affect his mind just as do his own. (Schopenhauer 378-379) 
27 Isabelle Gadoin also summarizes perfectly how, in Hardy’s writing, the celebration of the
ordinary combines with the dispossession of individuals as people or subjects:
The refusal of any philosophy based on a constituting consciousness that would
give existence and meaning to the objects  that  surround it,  and conversely  the
openly stated preference for a subject that is barely one, entirely “caught in the
fabric  of  the  world”  or  “in  the  middle  of  things”,  is  also  what  leads  Hardy  to
celebrate  the  primitive,  the  child-like,  the  naïve,  the  senseless,  and  all  those
country folk of equal simple-mindedness and superstition […] who live in a minor
mode of consciousness and volition, but are precisely thereby brought closer to the
world they see themselves fated to inhabit, a world whose silent language they can
listen to and which remains irreducible to knowledge and understanding. They are
at once bewildered and self-forgetful, a combination that is also the assurance of
open-mindedness, of complicity and of sympathy with the world. (Gadoin 77)10 
28 I  would argue that  with Hardy the ultimate dispossession of  the self  appears  in the
diffusion of the author’s identity, the way he systematically expressed himself in various
modes – novels,  short  stories,  poems long and short,  notebook entries,  unclassifiable
works  such  as  The  Dynasts,  and,  last  but  not  least,  especially  where  this  paper  is
concerned, in his ghosted third-person autobiography, The Life and Work of Thomas Hardy.
In addition to the simple distancing device of the third-person narrative, from the onset
of  that  implausible  work  Hardy  does  present  himself  less  as  a  person  than  as  a
combination, a collection of lines weaving identity and geography:
Owing to the accident of his being an architect’s pupil in a county-town of assizes
and aldermen, which had advanced to railways and telegraphs and daily London
papers; yet not living there, but walking in every day from a world of shepherds
and ploughmen in a hamlet three miles off, where modern improvements were still
Hardy’s Humanity: “A Strange Respect for the Individual, an Extraordinary Res...
FATHOM, 4 | 2016
8
regarded  as  wonders,  he  saw  rustic  and  borough  doings  in  a  juxtaposition
peculiarly close. To these externals may be added the peculiarities of his inner life,
which might almost have been called academic – a triple existence, unusual for a
young man – what he used to call, in looking back, a life twisted of three strands –
the professional life, the scholar’s life, and the rustic life, combined in the twenty-
four hours of one day, as it was with him through these years. (Hardy 1989, 36)
29 Here is indeed Deleuze’s vision of the individual as a “unique chance” (“the accident of his
being”), an unstable threefold composite (“a triple existence”, “a life twisted of three
strands”).  The  notion  of  a  variable  identity  is  not  an  unusual  consideration  in  the
intellectual and artistic context of Hardy’s life and work as novelist or poet – whether it is
the “double poem” of the Victorian era11, or the “multiplicity that is one” explored by
Modernism and already to be found in Bergson:
Is my own person, at a given moment, one or manifold? If I declare it one, inner
voices arise and protest – those of the sensations, feelings, ideas, among which my
individuality is distributed. But, if I make it distinctly manifold, my consciousness
rebels quite as strongly; it affirms that my sensations, my feelings, my thoughts are
abstractions which I effect on myself,  and that each of my states implies all the
others. I  am then […] a unity that is multiple and a multiplicity that is one […].
(Bergson 257-258)
30 Hardy’s writing clearly testifies to that constant oscillation between the one and the
manifold in the task of defining the subject, and The Life and Work is indeed, as I’ve just
mentioned, a perfect illustration of that. Hardy’s perception of the manifold nature of
identity is expressed in very explicit terms, as for instance in a notebook entry from 1890:
“Dec. 4. I am more than ever convinced that persons are successively various persons,
according  as  each  special  strand  in  their  characters  is  brought  uppermost  by
circumstances” (Hardy 1989, 241).  This points clearly to the distinction established by
Paul Ricoeur between identity as ipseity or selfhood (which Hardy’s words describe) and
the invariable sameness of the idem-identity12. Hardy’s perception of individuals as being
made  of  different  “strands”  woven  into  a  variable  whole  is  also  directly  echoed  by
Deleuze’s own words: “We are made up of lines which are variable at each instant, which
may be combined in different ways, packets of lines, longitudes and latitudes, tropics and
meridians, etc. There are no mono-fluxes. The analysis of the unconscious should be a
geography rather than a history.” (Deleuze & Parnet 102)
31 One poem is particularly telling in that respect, as it combines Hardy’s attachment to
Wessex in its geography – down to its very topographic specificities – with his sense of
the variousness of identity:
Wessex Heights (1896)
There are some heights in Wessex, shaped as if by a kindly hand
For thinking, dreaming, dying on, and at crises when I stand,
Say, on Ingpen Beacon eastward, or on Wylls-Neck westwardly,
I seem where I was before my birth, and after death may be.
[...]
Down there I seem to be false to myself, my simple self that was,
And is not now, and I see him watching, wondering what crass cause
Can have merged him into such a strange continuator as this,
Who yet had something in common with himself, my chrysalis.
                           (Satires of Circumstances, 1914; Hardy 2001, 319-320)
32 Here is again Wessex as D. H. Lawrence described it, “vital and vivid” (Lawrence 70), the
poet’s persona and self both appearing as “blocs of variable sensations”. Similarly to what
is at work in The Life and Work, it is here the appearance of the third-person pronoun that
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comes to signal the divestiture of the self. This is also what Deleuze expresses specifically
in the case of literature, stating that “[i]t is not the first two persons that function as the
condition for literary enunciation; literature begins only when a third person is born in
us that strips us of the power to say ‘I’” (Deleuze 3). 
33 “Wessex Heights” offers an extremely complex experience of geographic identification
(both as ipseity and as sameness), which I’d like to explore a little by focusing solely on
the extract quoted above, significantly corresponding to the opening and closing stanzas
of the poem. One may read there how the poet’s persona is clearly woven (“merge”) by
the combination of many lines: by the gradients of those heights that constitute Wessex,
the toponymy of which,  both strange and familiar to the ear,  somehow imprints the
contrasting levels  graphically  upon the page (“Ingpen Beacon”,  “Wylls-Neck”);  by  his
various moods and actions (“For thinking, dreaming, dying on”); by the intertwining of
different tenses and modes (“where I was before”, “after death may be”, “my simple self
that was,/ And is not now”); and of course by the complex use of pronouns. It is the latter
point which, in the last stanza, precisely comes to mark the dissolution threatening the
subject caught in a spiralling of identity whereby the I is detached from the self (“I seem
to be false to myself ”) and where each part of the subject seems to be contemplating the
other, though not as its exact reflection (“I see him watching”). The poem ends with the
image of a poignant ontological dispossession, since the subject as true primeval being
(“my simple self”) is evoked indirectly by the distancing of the third person (“himself”),
and appears as nothing more than an empty shell (“my chrysalis”). However, the poem
also ends with the ironic convergence of all  threads (“merge”) into an eerie sense of
communion  (“strange  continuator”,  “something  in  common”),  an  intense  form  of
weaving confirmed by the motif of the chrysalis. What this analysis hopes to show is how
Hardy’s  poetic  writing  itself  operates  as  a  sort  of  porous  threshold  that  necessarily
combines voices and identities, thus mirroring the complexity of the conscious subject.
34 In “Wessex Heights” as elsewhere it is again, as previously said, the appearance of the
third person that  signals  self-dispossession.  Throughout  Hardy’s  work,  one may thus
encounter a fair amount of poems which likewise seem to enact that breached identity,
bearing  third-person  titles  but  turning  out  to  be,  upon  reading,  unequivocal
homodiegetical  reflections  or  narratives:  such is  the  case  of  “He Abjures  Love”,  “He
Prefers Her Earthly”, “He Never Expected Much”, “He Resolves to Say No More” – to name
but a few.
35 The distancing such titles establish can signal a refusal of involvement on the poet’s part,
but they also offer the possibility of a paradoxically introspective act of self-criticism, as
is the case in “He Follows Himself” (Late Lyrics and Earlier,1922; Hardy 2001, 645-646):
In a heavy time I dogged myself
        Along a louring way,
Till my leading self to my following self
        Said: ‘Why do you hang on me
              So harassingly?’
‘I have watched you, Heart of mine,’ I cried,
         ‘So often going astray
And leaving me, that I have pursued,
        Feeling such truancy
              Ought not to be.’
He said no more, and I dogged him on
        From noon to the dun of day
By prowling paths, until anew
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        He begged: ‘Please turn and flee! –
              What do you see?’
‘Methinks I see a man,’ said I,
         ‘Dimming his hours to gray.
I will not leave him while I know
        Part of myself is he
              Who dreams such dree!’
‘I go to my old friend’s house,’ he urged,
         ‘So do not watch me, pray!’
‘Well, I will leave you in peace,’ said I,
         ‘Though of this poignancy
              You should fight free:
‘Your friend, O other me, is dead;
        You know not what you say.
– ‘That do I! And at his green-grassed door
        By night’s bright galaxy
              I bend a knee.’
– The yew-plumes moved like mockers’ beards
        Though only boughs were they,
And I seemed to go; yet still was there,
        And am, and there haunt we
              Thus bootlessly.
36 One can note how the poem presents a clear distinction between the self as subject (“He”/
“I”) and as object (the reflexive “Himself”/ “myself”), one only too explicitly pursuing the
other (“my leading self”/ “my following self”13)  yet each pursuing a goal of his own.
Beneath the apparent cleaving lies a subjective confusion once again introduced by the
interplay of pronouns. As in “Wessex Heights”, “myself” becomes “he”, yet so does “I”, as
hinted at by the initial shift from “I dogged myself” to “Till my leading self to my following
self”. Incidentally, the two “selves” of the poem are concomitantly the two halves of a
whole (“Part of myself is he ”) and discrete doubles (“O other me”). Besides, not only is the
subject caught in the dialectical exchange with himself, but he is also involved in the
complex dynamics of pursuit and avoidance, of self-withdrawal (“So do not watch me,
pray!”)  and  persistent  trailing  (“I  dogged  him  on”,  “I  will  not  leave  him”).  By
incorporating the single  “his”  of  the departed friend (“his  green-grassed door”),  the
subject opens himself to a possible equation of I with the Other, thus presenting his inner
cleaving as the prime condition to the encountering of subjects.14 The final stanza of the
poem reveals that the encounter can occur thanks to the perviousness of ghosts, since it
is in haunting (“haunt”) and incorporeity (“bootlessly”) that the two “I”s can effectively
meet, thus eventually signalling the impossibility of a divided subject (“I seemed to go; yet
still was  there”)  as  well  as  the  move from an obsessive  pursuit  to  the integrity  and
permanence of a constitutive loyalty (“And am”). 
37 Much more could be said about Hardy’s poetic writing to illustrate the fragmentation of
the self, but it would seem particularly appropriate to end with one piece that expresses a
form of reconciliation of such fragmented parts and summarizes once more the Deleuzian
idea of the individual as a “bloc of variable sensations”: the aptly named “So Various” (
Winter  Words,  1928;  Hardy 2001,  870-871).  The poem exposes  all  the identities  of  the
speaker,  albeit  contradictory  identities,  as  distinctive  personalities,  yet  concludes  by
revealing their essential consistency, the fundamental multiplicity that is one:
Now. . . . All these specimens of man,
So various in their pith and plan,
                 Curious to say
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                 Were one man. Yea,
                 I was all they.
38 Curious  to  say,  that  what  elicits  that  “strange”  or  “extraordinary  respect  for  the
individual” is the perception of the latter’s essential fragmentation or inconsistencies.
Like Hardy’s biography – the biography of him by him – the poem operates a levelling of
the subjective and objective forms of the persona (note the two pronouns framing the last
line) which is indeed the ultimate form of dispossession of the self, striking a perfect
balance between ipseity and sameness.
39 One man, so various. As the term “specimens” may reveal, Hardy’s reflections on the
variousness of identity exemplifies – on a larger scale – the methods and position of a
keen explorer of humanity in all its diversity.
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NOTES
1. My translation. “Le Wessex n’est pas objet de connaissance posé face aux personnages, il est
comme un limon déposé au fond des consciences, selon une sorte de solidarité constitutive de
l’espace et du temps. Le monde perçu est bien plus que le simple monde sensoriel : il est tissé de
toutes les expériences vécues”.
2. See Bénédicte Coste, “Charles du Bos, lecteur de Thomas Hardy”, Miranda 4 (2011), Online since
01 June 2011, connection on 04 January 2015. URL : http://miranda.revues.org/2056.
3. My translation. “Mais ce sens de la vie en général dont Hardy nous aère et nous suffoque est
toujours, en dernier ressort, tonifiant, salubre et comme chargé de sel ; et le miracle dans le cas
de Hardy, c’est qu’il puisse exercer sur nous telle action sans avoir jamais vraiment aimé la vie.
                            For Life I had never cared greatly
[...] Oui, mais parfois chez les grands, – quand ils sont très grands, – de n’aimer pas la vie n’a
d’autre résultat que de faire que davantage encore l’on aime les êtres humains, qu’on les aime
précisément parce qu’ils sont comme soi sujets au sort de vivre.”
4. “Even in these smallest of nature’s manifestations there is an intensity of life which serves to
enlarge one’s sense of the far greater intensity within the human protagonists” (Irwin 6).
5. My translation. “À bien des égards George Eliot et Thomas Hardy sont très loin l’un de l’autre ;
ici  pourtant ils se rejoignent,  comme ne peuvent pas ne pas se rejoindre tous les génies que
volontiers j’appellerais génies  de sympathie,  ceux qui ont pour religion – et parfois pour seule
religion – celle qu’en une formule injustement décriée on appelait  naguère "la religion de la
souffrance humaine”.
6. “Junkers” is a historical term referring to members of the German nobility, more particularly
Prussian aristocrats. 
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7. Michael Millgate comments: “The shift from the homely and, surely, personal instance (the
tankard ‘must’ have been his beloved father’s) to the abstract formulation is typically Hardyan,
and the conception itself – so crisply exemplified by the later image of England as ‘scored with
prints of vanished hands’ [‘On an Invitation to the United States’, CP 75] – had already informed
his ‘reading’ of the Dorset landscape in The Return of the Native, especially of the heath itself in the
famous opening chapter” (Millgate 189). Hardy’s consideration of “the beauty of association” is
also expressed in Tess of the d’Urbervilles, when, a year after Angel married and deserted her, the
distraught heroine considers the magnificence of the Vale of Blackmoor,  an objective beauty
which her personal experience necessarily transforms before her eyes: “Beauty to her, as to all
who have felt, lay not in the thing, but in what the thing symbolized” (Hardy 2003, 297).
8. See Laurence Estanove, “Thomas Hardy, Two on a Tower : vers une redéfinition cosmique de
l’appartenance”, Cahiers Victoriens et Édouardiens 67 (avril 2008) : 55-66.
9. See Carl  J.  Weber,  “Hardy’s  Copy of  Schopenhauer”, Colby  Quarterly 4:12 (November 1957):
217-224.
10. My translation. “Ce refus de toute philosophie d’une conscience constituante qui donnerait
lieu et sens aux objets qui l’entourent, cette préférence avouée pour un sujet qui soit à peine
sujet, et tout entier “pris dans le tissu du monde” ou dans le “milieu des choses”, est aussi ce qui
amène Hardy à exalter le primitif, l’enfant, le naïf, le fou, et tous ces paysans aussi simples que
superstitieux [...] qui vivent sur un mode mineur de la conscience et de l’intentionnalité, mais
sont par là même plus proches du monde auquel ils se croient prédestinés, et dont ils savent
écouter le langage silencieux, irréductible à la connaissance et à l’entendement. Ceux-ci mêlent à
l’étonnement une forme d’oubli de soi qui est elle aussi gage d’ouverture, de complicité et de
sympathie envers le monde.”
11. The phrase is used by Isobel Armstrong in Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics and Politics to evoke
poems, or dramatic monologues of the Victorian era that offer a dramatized vision of the divided
consciousness.  In  E. Warwick  Slinn’s  words,  these  are  poems  “in  which  the  Victorian  poet
dramatizes and objectifies the simultaneous existence of unified selfhood and fracturing self-
awareness” (Slinn, 56).
12. “Le  problème  de  l’identité  personnelle  constitue  à  mes  yeux  le  lieu  privilégié  de  la
confrontation entre les deux usages majeurs du concept d’identité [...]. Je rappelle les termes de
la confrontation : d’un côté l’identité comme mêmeté (latin : idem ; anglais : sameness ; allemand : 
Gleichheit), de l’autre l’identité comme ipséité (latin : ipse ; anglais : selfhood ; allemand : Selbstheit)”
(Ricoeur 1990, 140).
13. It also seems interesting to note how the blurring of identity is particularly well conveyed by
the obsessive use of the reflexive term (“self”) which for François Récanati constitutes a marking
of opacity, as explained by Paul Ricoeur: “Under the evocative title La Transparence et l’énonciation
[1979],  François  Récanati  introduces  pragmatics  by  making  reflexivity  appear  as  a  factor  of
opacity that interferes with the presumed transparency of a sense that, without it, would allow
the referential intention to pass through.” (Ricoeur 1992, 41). One might also refer to Hardy’s
poem “At a  Seaside Town in 1869” (Moments  of  Vision,  1917;  Hardy 2001,  499-501)  where the
speaker compares the external reality with the ideal world of his thoughts (“the pure/ Thought-
world") by alternately standing “outside myself”, “inside myself”, “Beyond myself”.
14. Although the poem “I Was Not He” (Late Lyrics and Earlier, 1922; Hardy 2001, 571-572) would
seem to highlight the impossibility of such equation, it nonetheless creates the possibility of an
encounter between “he” and “I” via the “you” of the woman loved by each successively. 
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ABSTRACTS
This paper uses Deleuze’s  reflections on Hardy’s  writing to examine the sense of  the latter’s
humanity as it attaches itself to a compassionate celebration of the individual. Though scarce,
Deleuze’s remarks on Hardy open the way for an exploration of how questions of identity, of the
self and the subject are dealt with in Hardy’s poetry. Hardy’s humanity is here considered as a
form of  humanism expressed through the author’s  sincere attachment to  the living and the
human,  to  the  individual’s  commonplace  experiences  of  everyday  life,  but  also  in  a  wider
perspective that  offers  universal  sympathy –  an altruism at  the core of  many war poems in
particular. Ultimately, Hardy’s interest in the human scale allows the poet to convey through his
verse the sense of a fragmented self,  many illustrations of  which can be found in the poet’s
personal or introspective pieces.
En  partant  des  réflexions  de  Deleuze  sur  l’écriture  de  Hardy,  nous  souhaitons  ici  étudier  le
sentiment d’humanité de ce dernier,  célébration de l’individu tout empreinte de compassion.
Bien que très éparses, ces remarques de Deleuze sur Hardy ouvrent la voie à une exploration de
la façon dont la poésie hardyenne traite les questions d’identité, du sujet et du soi. L’humanité de
Hardy s’envisage ici comme un humanisme qui s’exprime dans l’attachement sincère de l’auteur
au vivant et à l’humain, aux expériences ordinaires de l’individu au quotidien, mais également
dans la perspective plus large d’une compassion universelle – altruisme qui se trouve au cœur de
plusieurs poèmes de guerre, notamment. En dernier lieu, l’intérêt que porte Hardy à l’échelle
humaine  lui  permet  de  relayer,  par  le  biais  de  sa  poésie,  le  sentiment  d’un être  fragmenté,
sentiment que viennent illustrer de nombreux poèmes personnels ou introspectifs.
INDEX
Mots-clés: humanité, altruisme, ordinaire, identité, soi, sujet, Deleuze (Gilles), philosophie,
poésie
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